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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
v. 
LESTER RALPH ROMERO, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 16638 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with the criminal offense of Theft 
by Receiving, a second degree felony. 
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
Appellant was convicted at a bench trial on April 2, 1979. 
A Motion in Arrest of Judgment was heard and later denied on 
May 17, 1979. On August 20, 1979, the appellant was sentenced 
to one to fifteen years in prison which was stayed pending a 
ninety day evaluation at the prison and further stayed pending 
this appeal. The appellant was admitted to bail. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction with an order 
to dismiss the information. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 25, 1979, Investigator Charles Collins of the 
Salt Lake County Attorney's office arrrested the appellant, Lester 
Romero, under authority of an arrest warrant issued in another 
matter. Investigator Collins, who had been investigating the 
appellant on a wide range of matters full time for six weeks 
prior to this arrest, (R-133) went to appellant's home at 8:30 
a.m., with a sheriff's sergeant and, pursuant to plan, waited 
for the appellant to get in a vehicle and drive out on a public 
roadway whereupon he was stopped. (R-132) 
After appellant was taken into custody, he was asked for 
permission to search the truck he was driving and he refused. 
(R-110-111) After conferring by radio with a deputy county attor-
ney who advised him to "seize the vehicle for evidence," (Def. 
Ex. 3, Attached Appendix A), Investigator Collins impounded the 
truck which was registered to "Golden Circle Investments by Lester 
Romero." (R-111) Investigator Collins then went through the 
truck seizing numerous i terns, mostly documents, including a stamp-
ed, sealed envelope addressed to "ABC" in Woods Cross, Utah, 
(States Exhibit 10) which became the critical link to all evidence 
used against the defendant in this case. 
While the State contended at the Motion to Suppress that 
this was a "routine impound inventory," (Memorandum in Opposition 
R-23, et. ~·) no written impound inventory was made. In re-
sponse to a court order to produce the inventory, Investigator 
-2-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Collins furnished a "Supplementary Report" to the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office, (Exhibit D-C, attached hereto as Appendix 
A) which describes the arrest, search and seizure and lists the 
"items of possible evidence" which were "seized pending further 
investigation." Following the list of documents and papers, 
the report stated further: "These items were all secured for 
further investigation and as possible evidence." Thus, inventory 
of the seized items was made at the County Attorney's Office 
some time following the seizure. (R-124, 154). 
The report also described in general terms (e.g., "miscellan-
eous tools, fishing gear, mechanical equipment.") the items which 
were not "secured." Contrasting the nature of the items seized 
and inventoried, "for further investigation" with those "not 
secured" or inventoried in the report, (Exhibit D-6, Appendix 
A), clearly establishes the investigatory nature of the seizure 
and refutes any claim that the items were seized to protect the 
property. For example, a scrap of paper with numbers written 
on it and a lawyer's business card were seized, inventoried and 
photocopied, while tools and sporting equipment were not. 
With the exception of the safety inspection sticker which 
was improperly affixed to the windshield, Investigator Collins 
had no probable cause to believe that any of the items and papers 
which were seized were contraband, instrumentalities of an of-
fense, or even evidence of an offense. Investigator Collins 
testified at the hearing on a motion to suppress that he attached 
-3-
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no significance to the "ABC envelope" until a "confidential info:. 
mant" asked to see the i terns seized because there was "something 
in there we needed to know about." (R-127) Investigator Collins 
showed a photocopy of the envelope to the informant who told h~ 
that he had been told by the appellant that there was a stolen 
semi-tractor stored at "ABC." 
That information, along with further information derived 
therefrom and the contents of the envelope (money orders for um 
became the probable cause evidence contained in the affidavtt 
for a search warrant of storage units at ABC Storage in Woods 
Cross. (Exhibit D-3, Attached hereto as Appendix Bl The sear~ 
under that warrant produced the critical evidence linking appel-
lant to the stolen semi-tractor, which was the subject of the 
instant prosecution. 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the envelope a~ 
the fruits of the ABC Storage search, appellant's counsel atte~~ 
ed to obtain the name of the person who was the informant because 
appellant believed the informant was his lawyer's investigator. 
(R-148-151) The hearing court refused to compel Investigator 
Collins to divulge whether or not the informant was appellant's 
lawyer's agent. (R-151) Defense counsel put on the undisputed 
testimony of appellant, that he had discussed what was taken 
in the seizure and his concern about the envelope and the stol~ 
semi-tractor with his attorney and the attorney's investigator, 
Craig McLaglahn, in obtaining advice concerning the legality 
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of the seizure. (R-151-162) Based upon this showing, defense 
counsel again attempted to verify if the informant was party 
to a privileged attorney-client conference because of the probable 
violation of the constitutional right to counsel. The State 
objected, without any evidence or represention establishing a need 
for preserving secrecy of the informant's name and the Court 
sustained the objection. (R-162-63) The appellant's motion to 
suppress was denied although this does not appear in the record. 
At trial, appellant's counsel objected to each item of evidence 
which was the fruit of the seizure of appellant's papers and/or 
the information on the grounds that the use of such evidence 
violated the Fourth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution. The objections were overruled and appellant 
convicted. 
Following the conviction, appellant made a motion in arrest 
of judgment based upon newly discovered evidence that the confi-
dential informant, who told Investigator Collins that appellant 
was concerned that an envelope which had been seized would lead 
to a stolen truck, had obtained the information from a privileged 
attorney-client conversation. (R-65) 
At the hearing on that motion, Investigator Collins testified 
that: At the time of the searches and seizures, investigating 
the appellant was his "major project." ( R-239) That the con-
fidential informant had told him that appellant was concerned 
about the envelope which had been seized because it could lead the 
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investigation to stolen property. (R-243) That among the papers 
which were seized was a deed conveying property to Craig 
McLaglahn's father and that he had discussed that document with 
Craig McLaglahn. (R-244) That Collins knew McLaglahn was an 
investigator for criminal defense attorneys and shared an office 
with appellant's corporate lawyer. (R-245) That Collins ex-
changed information with McLaglahn and McLaglahn had given inf~~ 
tion regarding appellant. (R-247-48) That Collins had told 
McLaglahn that he did not want any information coming from an 
attorney-client situation. (R-248-49) That Collins had no know-
ledge that any information received from the confidential infor-
mant was from attorney-client conversation. (R-248-49) 
The court sustained the State's objection to the ultimate 
question of whether McLaglahn was the confidential informant, 
but the court in doing so, stated he was assuming from the evi-
dence that McLaglahn was the informant. (R-254, 256) The court 
at that point also stated that the testimony of Collins indicat~ 
that the information regarding appellant's concern about the 
seized envelope was obtained by McLaglahn from a source other 
than an attorney-client conversation. (R-256) However, there 
was no direct evidence that this was in fact true. Collins had 
only testified that he told McLaglahn that he did not want priri· 
leged information (R-258-60) and that the confidential informant 
told him he had heard the conversation at a trailer court. IR-2~ 
~~ ~-
The whole thrust of this testimony was that Collins had no know· 
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ledge that information came from attorney-client 
(R-248, 249, 250) Collins, of course, could not testify as 
where McLaglahn had, in fact, received the information. 
Mr. David Bown testified he was an attorney at law. That 
he was retained by the appellant. That McLaglahn was acting 
as a defense investigator and that he had conditioned his accep-
tance of taking appellant's cases upon McLaglahn's assistance. 
(R-267) Mr. Bown testified that he had taken particular care 
to clearly define McLaglahn's status so as to make information 
McLaglahn obtained privileged because he was concerned about 
McLaglahn receiving an investigative subpoena from the County 
Attorney's Office. (R-278) Appellant came to Mr. Bown seeking 
advice as to whether the papers seized by Collins could be legally 
used and appellant expressed his concern particularly about the 
ABC envelope because it could lead to a stolen truck. (R-267-69, 
274) Mr. Bown testified that the only other person present during 
the conversation was McLaglahn. (R-270) 
Appellant, again, testified that he had not expressed his 
concern about the envelope to any other person. 
It was the State's position on the motion in arrest of judg-
ment that, if the information came fro~ an attorney-client conver-
sation, the State had no knowledge that it did and, hence, there 
was no state action involved. The State further argued that 
the conversation was not privileged because it pertained to.~~ 
going criminal conduct, the possession of stolen proper~y. 
-7-
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court indicated that it rejected the latter argument. (R-290) 
The court took the matter under advisement and then denied 
the motion. The court stated in its order that the facts cla~~ 
by the defendant were not supported by credible evidence. (R-7Ji 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE SEIZURE OF APPELLANT'S PAPERS VIOLATED THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AND THE USE OF INFORMATION DERIVED THEREFROM TO OBTAIN 
A SEARCH WARRANT RENDERED THE USE OF EVIDENCE SEIZED 
THEREUNDER INADMISSABLE. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution state; 
The right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated 
and no warrant shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath 
or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
With regard to the instant case, it should be noted that "papers" 
are explicitly specified protected items and that the amendment 
prohibits unreasonable seizures as well as unreasonable searches. 
While appellant believes that the search of the vehicle 
itself was unreasonable since it is rather clear that the investl· 
gator serving the arrest warrant planned the arrest as a pretext 
to search the vehicle, (see Exhibit D-6, attached hereto as Ap-
pendix Al it is not necessary for appellant to attack the sear~ 
since the seizure of the envelope for investigatory purposes 
-8-
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was clearly unreasonable. Thus, it is appellant's contention 
that even if Investigator Collins had a right to go through the 
contents of the vehicle which appellant was driving, he clearly 
had no right to seize papers without any probable cause to believe 
they were contraband or evidence. 
Since there was no search warrant, the burden is upon the 
State to show that the seizure of appellant's papers was within 
one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948); 
United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951); United States v. 
Murrie, 534 F.2d 695, 698 (6th Cir. 1976). 
In the court below, the State argued that the search and 
seizure came within the "routine impound inventory" and "plain 
view" exceptions to the warrant requirement. 
The "routine impound inventory" exception permits the neces-
sary search of an impounded vehicle to make an inventory of its 
contents to protect the owner's property interests, and to guard 
against false claims of lost property. South Dakota v. Opperman, 
428 U.S. 364 (1975); State v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 
517 (1968). 
In the first instance, this was not a "routine impound inven-
tory." Investigator Collins did not list all items in the truck 
at the time of the impound. No such inventory was ever made--let 
alone done as a part of the impound process with copies to the 
tow truck driver and appellant. Instead, Collins went through 
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the items in the truck, and seized anything which might be of 
evidentiary or investigative value and left unsecured and uninve:-
toried those items of no interest in his investigation of appel-
lant. Later, at the County Attorney's Office, ( R-120, 124, 1541, 
he listed the seized items in his supplementary report as items 
which "were all secured for further investigation and as possible 
evidence." (Exhibit D-6, attached hereto as Appendix Al. 
The seized papers were not put away for safekeeping but 
were photocopied (R-126,127) and shown to informants. (R-128, 
187; Affidavit for Search Warrant, Defendant's Exhibit 2, attachec 
hereto as Appendix Bl The "ABC" envelope was torn open and the 
contents studied, two money orders and a note stating "rent" 
with the unit number of the storage unit which was ultimately 
searched. (R-124, Affidavit, Appendix Bl 
The nature of the items "secured for further investigation 
and as possible evidence" (Appendix Al clearly demonstrates the 
extremely broad scope of Investigator Collins' interest in appel-
lant's business and associates. In contrast, the nature oft~ 
items not secured or inventoried demonstrates Collins' complete 
lack of concern for protecting valuables which were in the vehi-
cle. Where the police do not make a complete list of the propert" 
in an impounded vehicle but only list that which may be incrimi~­
ting, it cannot be fairly characterized as an inventory search. 
State v. Gluck, 518 P.2d 703, 707 (Wash. 19741. 
The impound inventory search exception to the warrant requlr' 
-10-
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ment cannot be used as a "pretext concealing an ir.vestigatory 
police motive." South Dakota v. Opperman, supra, at 375-76. 
Here there was not even a pretext of an impound inventory until 
the hearing on the motion to suppress. 
However, even if Collins discovered the envelope during 
a bona fide impound inventory search, he had no justification 
whatsoever to seize it and use it in his continuing investigation. 
At the time it was seized, he had no idea of its evidentiary 
value. (R-128) It was only when Craig McLaglahn told him that 
appellant was worried about an envelope which Collins had seized 
which could lead to a stolen truck, that Collins had anything like 
probable cause to believe it was evidence of a crime. Appellant 
is not arguing the distinction between "mere evidence" and "fruits 
or instrumentalities of a crime" because, when seized, the enve-
lope was neither. In the words of Investigator Collins, the 
papers were seized "for further investigation and as possible 
evidence." (Defendant's Exhibit 3, Appendix A, p. 5) (Emphasis 
added) 
The "plain view" exception to the warrant requirement merely 
excuses a search ~arrant where an officer in the lawful course 
of his duties sees contraband or otherwise seizeable articles--
it does not dispense with probable cause and allow an officer 
to seize anvtJ:iing he can see for further investigation. 
In State v. Elkins, 422 P.2d 250 (Ore. 1966), it was held 
that where an officer makes a lawful search and he observes some-
-11-
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thing which he does not know to be contraband but of which he 
is suspicious, seizure of the item is unreasonable even though 
his suspicion eventually proves well founded. The court observed: 
If the rule were otherwise, an 
officer who desired to inculpate an 
arrested person in another crime, 
could seize everything in such 
person's immediate possession and 
control upon the prospect that on 
further investigation some of it 
might prove to have been stolen 
or to be contraband. It would 
open the door to complete temporary 
confiscation of all an arrested 
person's property which was in 
his immediate possession and con 
trol at the time of his arrest 
for the purpose of a minute 
examination of it in an effort 
to connect him with another crime. 
422 P.2d at 254. 
The instant case presents an even more unreasonable seizun 
than the seizure in Elkins, for here, Collins did not have even 
a reasonable suspicion that the envelope was evidence of any-
thing. If the State's theory is upheld here, it would mean that 
a police officer could arrest a lawyer, for example, on a parki~ 
ticket warrant, seize his brief case, and take it to the County 
Attorney's office and photocopy the contents for leisurely 
perusal. Or, an officer invited to a social worker's office could 
seize and photocopy a psychologist's report because it was in 
"plain view" from where he lawfully was. It is difficult to 
hypothesize a more serious infringement of the security of a 
person's papers guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, than the 
-12-
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seizure which occured in the instant case. 
In United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), the United 
~ States Supreme Court held that the opening of a locked footlock-
er, seized from a lawfully arrested person's vehicle, and which 
the officers had ample probable cause to believe contained nar-
cotics, was unreasonable without a warrant because a footlocker 
is frequently a depository for personal papers and effects. 
Here Investigator Collins, without probable cause, seized, not 
a possible container for papers, but the papers themselves and 
he opened a sealed envelope which he knew to contain papers. 
A reading of the affidavit, (Appendix Bl, makes apparent the 
extent to which the "ABC" envelope was used in developing the 
probable cause for the search of the ABC Storage units in Woods 
Cross. Not only were the contents themselves described but the 
information in the affidavit which was obtained from both the 
informants and one witness was elicited by showing them the enve-
lope or a photocopy. (Affidavit for Search Warrant, Appendix 
B; R-187) Hence, the information obtained from the informants, 
the manager of ABC Storage, and the evidence seized under the 
search warrant were all "fruit of the poisonous tree" and should 
have been suppressed. ~' Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471, 488 (1963); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 
U.S. 385 (1920). The admission of that evidence at trial over 
appellant's Fourth Amendment objection requires reversal. ~· 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
-13-
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POINT II: THE AFFIDAVIT SUPPORTING THE 
SEARCH WARRANT WAS !~ADEQUATE ON ITS FACE 
TO PERMIT A MAGISTRATE TO MAKE AN EVALUATION 
OF THE RELIABILITY OF THE INFORMATION 
CONTAINED THEREIN. 
Regardless of the legality of the means used to gather t~ 
information contained in the affidavit used to obtain the sear~ 
warrant for ABC Storage, appellant contends that information 
was inadequate to enable the magistrate to evaluate its reliabili-
ty. Under Utah law, the information presented to a magistrate 
to establish probable cause for issuance of a search warrant 
must be given under oath and in writing. Sections 77-54-3 throur 
77-54-6, U.C.A. (1978 Ed.); State v. Jasso, 21 Utah 2d 24, 439 
P.2d 844 (1968). The affidavit submitted to the magistrate to 
support the issuance of a search warrant for ABC Storage was 
introduced into evidence at the hearing on appellant's motion 
to suppress (Defendant's Exhibi t2) and is reproduced in Appendix: 
of this brief. 
While it is clear that hearsay information may be used to 
develop probable cause for issuing a search warrant, it is eq~~ 
clear that the magistrate must be given sufficient information 
to enable the magistrate to make an independent judgment as to 
the credibility of the informant and the reliability of the infor· 
mation. Spinelli v. United States, 394 U.S. 410, 413 (19691; 
United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971). 
The information, in the affidavit, that a stolen semi-trac-
tor was in the ABC Storage units was hearsay from an unnamed cc: 
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dential informant and from Ron Lyle, a prison inmate. There 
is no information contained in the affidavit supporting the credi-
bility of the confidential informant and no basis whatsoever 
upon which the magistrate could have made a determination as 
to his credibility. 
The information from the prison inmate, Ron Lyle, was subject 
in part, to verification but the critical connection to the ABC 
Storage was not. In the court below, the State argued that Lyle's 
information was a statement against penal interest. However, 
the affidavit does not state whether or not Lyle was given immun-
ity or offered any benefit for his information. The State should 
not be allowed to mislead a magistrate into assuming a statement 
is a confession subjecting the declarant to liability, by remain-
ing silent about the circumstances when a full disclosure of the 
circumstances surrounding the statement would indicate otherwise. 
Furthermore, while the details of Lyle's statement concerning 
the theft of the semi-tractor were incriminating to himself and 
to an extent verifiable, the information that the semi-tractor 
had been turned over to appellant and stored at ABC Storage was 
neither self-incriminating nor verified. Rather, it was a classic 
statement of an accomplice incriminating another in his crime. 
In addition, Lyle's claim that he saw the truck in the storage 
units in December of 1977, did not give probable cause to believe 
it was still there eleven months later. 
Thus the magistrate had before him only the hearsay statement 
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from a source about which he knew absolutely nothing and the 
hearsay statement of a convicted felon and accomplice that the 
truck had been in the storage unit ten months earlier, made under 
unknown circumstances regarding immunity and reward for implicat-
ing appellant. This information clearly failed to meet the test 
of Spinelli, supra. See, also, Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 
( 1964). 
POINT III: THE COURT HEARING THE MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS ERRED IN REFUSING TO COMPEL 
DISCLOSURE OF WHETHER OR NOT SOME OF THE 
INFORMATION USED TO OBTAIN THE SEARCH WAP.RANT 
CAME FROM A PRIVILEGED ATTORNEY-CLIENT 
COMMUNICATION. 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, it became apparent 
to appellant that the confidential informant, who had informed 
Collins that appellant was concerned about an envelope which 
Collins had seized because it could lead to a stolen truck, must 
have been the defense invesigator who was present when appellant 
sought legal advice about the seizure.* 
Section 78-24-8(5), U.C.A. (1953 Replacement) provides: 
A public officer cannot be examined as to 
communications made to him in offical confidence 
when the public interests would suffer by the 
disclosure. 
*Citations to the record supporting factual assertions are 
contained in the Statement of Facts, supra. 
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However, here there was no showing by the State that the 
confidential informant made the statement to Collins "in official 
confidence" even if it is assumed that Collins is a "public 
officer." What is more important, there was no showing whatsoever 
that "the public interests would suffer by the disclosure." 
Concealing a violation of a breach of the attorney-client confi-
dence, particularily in a criminal case where Sixth Amendment 
rights are involved, certainly is not in the public interest. 
This ruling effectively prevented appellant from raising 
the Sixth Amendment violation (discussed infra in Point IV) before 
the judge who was ruling on the motion to suppress. While appel-
lant had an opportunity to raise the issue later before a dif-
ferent judge on a motion in arrest of judgment, it is submitted 
that appellant had a right to have the judge who was deciding 
whether or not to suppress the evidence review all constitutional 
defects in the obtaining of the warrant including evidence that 
part of the information came from a constitutionally privileged 
source. 
The judge who heard the motion in arrest of judgment was 
necessarily the trial judge whose duty it was to enter judgment. 
Furthermore, a motion in arrest of judgment is only vaguely de-
fined under Utah law and there are no standards regarding burden 
proof. See Section 77-35-10 U.C.A. (1977 Ed.) What in effect is 
a collateral attack after conviction is no substitute for pre-
senting evidence to the judge making the ruling on the motion to 
-17-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
suppress. The United States Supreme Court has on two occasions 
I 
refused to utilize post-conviction fact finding as a remedy when 
the possiblity of an intrusion on attorney-client communications 
came to light after conviction, and, instead, summarily vacated 
the conviction and remanded for trial so that the defendant coulc 
adequately protect himself against the use of tainted evidence. 
Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26 (1966); O'Brien v. United 
States, 386 U.S. 345 (1967). 
Because of the lack of foundation showing that the informa-
tion sought fell within the "official communication" privilege 
of Section 78-24-8, the court erred under Utah law in sustaining 
the objections to divulging whether the informant was the defun 
investigator. Even if the statute protected any information t~ 
State wished to call "confidential," such a statute would have t1 
yield to inquiry necessary to protect Sixth Amendment interests. 
This error can only be rectified by reversal and remand for 
further proceedings on the motion to suppress in the event t~t 
this Court does not reverse on grounds raised in the other point 
POINT IV: THE USE OF INFORMATION BY THE 
STATE OBTAINED FROM A DEFENSE INVESTIGATOR 
WHO WAS PRIVY TO ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS 
VIOLATED THE FOURTH, SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AND ARTICLE 1, SECTION 12 OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF UTAH. 
The issue addressed in this point was raised before the 
trial court by means of a motion in arrest of judgment .(R-641 
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The court's denial of the motion because he found that the facts 
claimed by the appellant were not supported by credible evidence 
(R-73) is perplexing because there was little factual dispute 
at the hearing on the motion. 
There was no question that the investigation of this case 
began when a confidential informant came to Investigator Collins 
and informed him that appellant had expressed concern about an 
envelope which Collins had seized because it could lead to where 
a stolen truck was stored. (R-243) That information was included 
in the Affidavit for Search Warrant. (Exhibit D-3, Appendix Bl 
While the court would not compel Collins to state whether or 
not the confidential informant was Craig McLaglahn, the court 
stated he was assuming it was. (R-254) David Bown, an attorney 
at law, testified that appellant came to him seeking advice on 
the legality of the seizure of the envelope, that Craig McLaglahn 
was present as a paid investigator for Mr. Bown, and that appel-
ant had expressed concern that the envelope could lead to where 
a stolen truck was stored. (R-262, ~· ~· l The appellant 
testified to the same effect. (R-282, et.~.) This evidence 
was not disputed or contradicted. 
The only factual contention involved appellant's testimony 
that he had not discussed the envelope seizure except with his 
attorney. (R-283) Somewhat opposed to this was Collins' testi-
mony that he had told McLaglahn he did not want information from 
attorney-client sources (R-258) and McLaglahn had told him that 
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the information came from conversations at a trialer court. 
(R-253) Neither side was willing to call McLaglahn as a witness, 
so there was no evidence that McLaglahn followed instructions 
or told Collins the complete truth. 
In the absence of any findings of fact or conclusions of 
law, it is difficult to determine the basis of the court's rea~~ 
ing below. Surely, the court did not find that Mr. Bown was 
not telling the truth under oath on the strength of what XcLaglar: 
told Collins about the source of his information. It is appel-
lant' s contention, supported infra, that the undisputed evidence 
shifted the burden to the State to establish that McLaghlan had 
obtained the information in some way completely unconnected ~~ 
his capacity as agent for appellant's attorney. 
Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to t~ 
State, it is submitted that the most that can be said, and this 
seems to have been the State's position below, is that the prose· 
cution was not aware that the information came from an attorney-
client communication and had not intended to intrude on the attor· 
I 
ney-client relationship. 1 
The law is quite clear that placing a double agent in a I 
defense camp requires revers a 1 . ~ , .::C.::a..::l.:::d:.::w:..::e:...:1:...:1=--v.:_:_. -=U..:.cn:..::i:...:t:...:e:...:d=--S_t_a_~· I 
205 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1953). In Caldwell, the agent had, like\ 
I 
McLaglahn, been warned against getting involved in attorney-die:' 
conversations. However, when the agent learned that the attorM·· 
and defendant were plotting another crime, caution was thrown 
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to the wind, and the agent reported regularly to the prosecution 
while working as a defense aid. The court vacated the conviction, 
holding that the breach of the right to counsel compelled reversal 
without any showing of prejudice. 
In Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26 (1966), the Supreme 
Court summarily vacated a conviction when the Solicitor of the 
United States informed the Court that the F.B.I. had tapped tele-
phone conversations and had furnished notes to the prosecutors. 
According to the representation of the Solicitor, upon which 
the Court was acting, the Tax Division which was prosecuting 
had not thought the material relevant to the prosecution and 
was not aware the notes contained any attorney-client information 
until a year after the trial. 
In O'Brien v. United States, 386 U.S. 345 (1966), the So-
licitor again informed the Court that the F.B.I. had intercepted 
a phone call wherein the defendant had requested his lawyer to 
get the territorial limits on his bail conditions changed. No 
information regarding any calls was ever communicated outside 
the F.B.I., but, again, the Court summarily vacated the conviction. 
The inference from Black and O'Brien is that ~breach 
of secrecy of attorney-client communications, per se, requires 
reversal and the dissents in those cases noted that. However 
in Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977), the majority re-
jected the interpretation stating: 
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If anything is to be inferred 
from these two cases [Black and 
O'Brien] with respect "[()the right 
to counsel, it is that when con-
versations with counsel have been 
overheard, the constitutionality 
of the conviction depends on 
whether the overheard conversations 
have produced, directly or·indirectly 
any of the evidence offered at 
trial. 429 U.S. at 553. 
In Weatherford, an undercover agent had been arrested along 
with some bona fide demonstrators. To maintain his cover he 
was charged and retained his own counsel. Ee attended a meeti~ 
with a co-defendant's lawyer, again to maintain his cover, but 
communicated nothing that he learned to the prosecution. His 
testimony at trial was confined to events preceding arrest. 
The Court held: 
There being no tainted evidence, 
no communication of defense 
strategy to the prosecution, 
and no purposeful intrusion by 
Weatherford, there was no violation 
of the Sixth Amendment as it is 
applicable to the states by virtue 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
429 U.S. at 558. 
Regardless of what inferences can now be drawn from ~ 
and O'Brien, the inference from Weatherford, itself, is that 
where the overheard attorney-client "have produced, directly 
or indirectly, any of the evidence at trial" a Sixth Amendment 
violation does occur. 429 U.S. at 553. It should be noted that 
the Court found that the agent Weatherford had no intent to vio-
late the attorney-client privilege. In the instant case, 
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McLaglahn certainly had the intent to violate the attorney-client 
privilege and did so on behalf of the State, even if Collins 
did not and had instructed McLauglahn not to relay attorney-client 
conversations. 
However, intent or motive should play a small part in deter-
mining the result of an infringement of the attorney-client confi-
dence. Caldwell v. United States, supra; Barber v. Municipal 
Court, 48 Law Week 2207, (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1979) (Decided on State 
Constitution grounds.) The point is that defendants must have 
absolute confidence that what they reveal to their lawyers will 
not and cannot be used against them if they are to have effective 
assistance of counsel. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
could be rendered meaningless if that confidence were violated 
by the lawyer himself without ~ intent, or indeed knowledge, 
the part of the prosecutor. 
Perhaps the clean hands or lack thereof of the prosecutor 
or the agent's superiors would be relevant where, as in Caldwell, 
supra, or Barber, supra, little or no prejudice could be demon-
strated, or in deciding whether the remedy should be suppression 
or out-right dismissal. However, here where the disclosure 
started the whole chain of the investigation, the prejudice is 
obvious and the question of suppression versus dismissal is not 
particularly meaningful because suppression would result in dismis-
sal any way. 
If this Court does not wish to enter the Sixth Amendment 
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thicket, then, it is respectfully submitted that reversal on 
this point could be grounded on Section 12 of Article One of 
the Constitution of Utah or on the Court's general supervisory 
powers over the judiciary and bar. Surely, the people of this 
State in seeking advice from a lawyer have a right to have abs~ 
lute confidence that what they tell the lawyer will not turn 
up in an affidavit for a search warrant. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the massive use of evi~m 
obtained in violation of the State and Federal Constitutions r~ 
quires reversal of the conviction, and, since it is apparent 
that without the illegally obtained evidence a conviction could 
not be obtained, remand with instructions to dismiss the infor-
mation. In the alternative, appellant requests that this Court 
establish guidelines as to the burden of proof in determining 
whether a violation of the attorney-client privilege occurred 
and remand for further proceedings on the motion to suppress 
and a new trial if appropriate. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN D. O'CONNELL 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Served two (2) copies of Appellant's Brief upon the Attorney 
General by leaving the same at his office at the Utah Capitol 
on this day of March, 1980. 
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~FFU~SE AS REPORTEO I CCOE VIOLATION l CATE AEPCATEC i CATE C.CCUAAEO I CASE 'lilUM8EA ICUTSIOE AGE-.C:Y •CASE NUMIEA 
COMPLAllllANT 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Ii SY~OPSIS 
ARREST OF LESTER RALPH ROXERO 
On August 25, ~978, at approximately 0750 hours, I proceeded to the area 
of the suspect s home. I made a drive past the susoect's heme and ob-
served in and around the suspect' s home four vehicles. There was a 
white over green Thunderbird. There was a green Chevette and a green 
Volkswagon and a light blue over dark blue Ford oickuo truck with a 
camper. · 
I then proceeded to park on 6200 South at approximately 1800 West. Ac 
approximately 0815 hours, Sgt. Dennis Harwood from the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Office joined me and set up surveillance west of the susoect's 
home. · 
At approximately 0830 hours, Sgt. Har•ood contac:ed me by radio and 
advised that the suspect had just left his home and had gotten into the 
blue Ford pickup truck with the camper. 
I then started the engine in my vehicle, pulled for•ard, and observed 
the sus?ect as he came to the stop sign at 2200 West on 6200 South. 
Suspect made a right turn and proceeded eastbound on 6200 South. I 
made a U-turn prior to the suspect getting to my location; and as the 
suspect passed, I pulled in behind the suspect and awaited Sgt. Harwood's 
arrival to stop the suspect with his red light. However, orior to 
Sgt. Harwood's arrival, I obse,,-ved the suspect pull his pickuo truck 
to the right and off the roadway and turn off the engine. 
I exited my vehicle and proceeded to meet the suspect at the left rear 
corner of his pickup truck. I there displayed my badge and identifi-
cation card and requested the suspect to produce a driver's license. 
Suspect pulled out his wallet from his right hip poc&et and started 
looking through it. The suspect appeared to be quite nervous and his 
hand was visibly shaking. The suspect did not apoear to be locating 
a driver's license. 
I asked the suspect if he had a driver's license and he stated that he 
did. He continued :o look but was not able to come uo with one. I 
then asked the susoect if he had any kind of identification. He then 
gave me a card, typewritten, with his name and address on it. He asked 
what this was all about. I advised him that I had an outstanding 
warrant for his arrest. 
At this ti~e Sg:. Dennis Har•ood had ?arked his vehicle to the rear of 
mine and had
0 
come forNard. Mr. Romero was advised as to the 1 charges 
against him and taken to Sgt. Harwood' s car and given a field search 
by Sgt. Harwood. 
Sgt. ::ar.r1ood, at my request, then removed the suspect's wallet and I 
looked through the wallet and asked the suspect if there was any cash 
!!!Oney in the wallet for security reasons. He wanted to know why I was 
interested in cash ~oney, and I advised him that it ~as for security 
~ur~oses so that u~on his arrival at the jail i: there was any money 
~i~h him at the tiMe of ar~est, that there would be an agreement as to 
hew ~uch that ~as. Suspect stated that t~ere ~as no money in his wallet. 
OISl>OSIT•ON 1 NVESTtGATOAS S1GNATUAE DATE I Ai'PAOVEO BY 
i 
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I then continued to look through the wallet and located a te~oorarv 
driver's license, #C22495S, a Class C license signed by Leste~ la~h 
1
, 
Romero. It indicated it ~as a duplicate license orom ~523-36-8859. 
The suspect's wallet was then ::-etu~ed to him ar.c! he was placed in t~e 
=ronc seat of Sgt. Harwood's vehicle. , 
A check was then run through the Sheriff's frequency disoatche= to 
determine the status of Mr. Romero's driver's license. The Sheriff 1s 
Oispatc~er Frequency T-'.Jo advised t:tat Mr. Romero's driver's license ·.oa! 
susoenC.ed. The license in his i:>ossession indicated an examination dat1 
of 6-27-78 and an expiration date of 9-27-78. 
I then took a copy of the warrant #78-CRS-368 and gave a cooy of the 
".Jarrant to Mr. Romero. I then re:noved !1r. Romero from Sgt. ?.ar-Nood's 
vehicle and advised him of his Constitutional rights f:-om the .standa:-j 
P.O.S.T. Rights Card. This was at approximately .J845 hours. Mr. Ro'!r: 
stated that he understood his rights. 
Mr. Romero's vehicle was stopped at 0833 hours and he was arres tea at 
0835 hours. 
After reading Mr. !!.o:nero his rights, I asked him who C'.<ned t!'!e vehide. 
He asked me why I wan:ed to know. I advised Mr. RornerJ t~at it ~ace a 
difference as to what action was taken in regards to t~e vehicle. I 
advised him that if the veh:.cle was his property that we would orobabl·: 
do with it as he directed and that if he wanted it .parked a<id locked 
we would probably do that. ! advised him, however, that if t;;e •1ehicl' 
did not belong to hi:o that we would contact the party to '"hem it did 
belong and advise them where they would be able to locate t!'!e vehicle. 
Mr. Ro~ero then stated that the vehicle belonged to Go:den Circle 
Invest?:lent Corporation. I asked Xr. Romero who I should contact at 
Golden Circle and he stated t:.at I should contact Bill Harni:ton. I 
asked him if he could advise me how to get a hold of Mr. Ha~ilton aod 
he stated that he could not understand wI-.y I wanted to kno·• s'..nce I had 
been at Mr. Hamilton's ho!Ile just the day before. I advised ~1r. ~o'.':le:o 
that that was correct; however. I was not going to t-:-avel to ~r. Hamil:~ 
home at this time. If he had a te leohone number for >tr. :Iarni l ton, I 
would contact him. He stated that he had none. 
I then asked him what his connection with Golden Circle Inves ::nent ·..;as 
He stated that he was t~e ~aintenance raan for Golden Circle and then 
declined to make any f~rther statement. 
I then contacted via County Attorney radio frequency Greg 30.,,,, and '''''' 
hi~ of the si:uation. Prior to doing this, however, Sgt. Ear~ood had. 
as~ed Xr. Romero for ::iermission to search the vehicle, and he had declL:.~ 
giving such permission. 
After advising Greg Bo""'n of t?i.e situation, I requested in::::J!l:laticn as:: 
what action to take conce=-ning securing or releasing t~e vehicle. Mr 
B~~ advised that the vehicle should be seized as evidence. Coon 
receiving this inior.nation, Sgt. Har"'.¥ood ::-equested :::.:;m t~e Sherif: 1 s 
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frequency a wrecker for evidence imt>ound. The Sheriff then disoatched 
Har~on's 1 66 Service Wrecker. Mr. Harmon, from the wrecker coT.Pany, came 
to t~e scene and subseque~cly im?ounded t~e vehicle ~r. ~cmero was in at 
2860 West 3500 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84119, tele~hone nu.~ber 
969-4749. No further action was taken toward the truck until the arrival 
of Mr. Hanion. 
Upon Mr. Har~on's arrival, ~yself and Sgt. Harwood did an inventory of 
the contents of the vehicle. We found in the cab of the vehicle several 
items which appear to be items of possible evidence. These items were 
seized pending further investigation. ':hese items consisted of t~e 
following: 
l. A 1978 vehicle registration for the vehicle which was impounded, 
a 1970 Ford pickup, license i!WS 4921. This registration indicated 
the owner of the vehicle as Golden Circle Invest~ent, Box 15998 
(2255 West North Tempce, Salt Lake City). The vehicle, however, 
was signed owner's name - Golden Circle by Lester Romero. 
2. A letter addressed to Ervin Romero, Box 15998, Salt Lake Ci:y, 
Utah 84115. This letter being from :he Douvall Press Finance 
Publications. 
3. A letter addressed to Gary Nyer, 8701 West 3500 South, Magna. It 
had the return address of Royal Acceptance Corporation in Salt Lake 
City and through that was scratched the address of 338 East 100 






top {:his is the suspect Romero's home address). 
A card from John E. Runyand, Attorney at Law, Salt Lake City. 
A check ~ade out to Rotostripper for $12.95. The check was on the 
First Security Bank of Utah, 1,151-14015-23. It was signed Lester 
Romero and had been cashed. The address on the check for Romero 
was 616 Colorado Street, Salt Lake City, 84084. However, that had 
been written through and the address of 6266 South Morgray Drive 
had been written in. The check was paid by the bank on February 21, 
1978. 
Also in the front seat was found a copy of a Quit-Claim Deed from 
Lester Romero and Maxine Ro~ero to Golden Circle Incon>orated. This 
was notarized by ~argo Bartholomew. Tiiere was a state~ent on the 
ot~er side to che effect that it was a true cooy of an original 
document. On this was also written "Defendant's Exhibit 17-D." 
Also in the truck was found in the cabin an Abst=act of Title pre-
pared by Alex E. Carr Company on the same property as related in 
t~e Quit-Claim Deed. 
Also in the vehicle was a copy of a registration for a trailer, 
A 60797, indicating the owner's name as Don ~urst, dba S & T. 
!'his was signed by Don Hurst; however, the signature appeared to 
be t~at of Lester Romero's. 
OATE I APP~OViDIY 
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9. There was also a customer's copy of a Wa!ker :Sank ~ar.~americard Tia'. 
out to Geraldine P. Barker and signed by Ronald 3ar~er for a tota;" 
of $9.51. The invoice was to Quinn's Auto Parts. 
10. There was another one to Genuine Auto Parts on the same credit cc~~ 
signed by Ronald Barker. However, the signature on these two in'lo'.: 
appeared to be different. 
Invoice in 1!9 for $9. 51 was lft5083663 and the invoice in 1110 for 
$27.39 was #5144421. 
11. The next item found was a note indicating ;:>a:n!lent of $:!., 007. 00 fo, 
Industrial Power of some type. 
12. Next item was a letter from the Murray City Corporation to :-!ur:ay 
Trailer Court, Box 15998, Salt Lake City, l:tah apparently regarding 
the disconnection of service of elect:<icity, water, and sewage. 
13. There were also t-.ro bank statements for Golden Circle from the Her'.· 
Bank & Trust, 4129 South 1750 West in Salt Lake City. The bank 
statements were in effect deposit receipts, one for $2, 888. 52 and 
another for $858.28. 
14. There was also a check made payable to Industrial Power for Sl,07l 
on the Golden Circle Investment account. The check was dated 7-iJ.' 
and was check 1;155 and was signed by Dale S:nit.h. 
15. There was also a yellow piece of oaoer which stated "Received f:oo 
Les Romero August 15th $15. 00 for· a· refrigerator." It was signed 
"Beverly E. Etherington." 
16. There were also three keys to some Chrysler-type vehicle. 
17. The next item 'N'aS a bulk mailing circular to Ervin ?.err.ere at Box i;: 
Salt Lake City. On the other side, in what appea:<ed to be Lester 
Romero's handwriting, was a membership request form filled out for 
a three-year me~bership in apparently some type of a club. 
18. Next item was a sealed envelope with two one-cent stamps on it ar.~ 
addressed to A B C, 2250 South 300 '..lest, Woods Cross, Utah 84087. 
The return adc!ress was to Brother Dis Co, at 3955 South State, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. Through the envelope co\!ld be seen what ap?ea'~d 
to be checks. I then opened the envelope and found two money om::. 
one for $30. 00; jft04- 704, 887, 078 ir:ade out to A B C. This was on . 
State Savings & Loan Association. I also found one !l".ade payable 7~:, 
$35. 00 1!04-710, 300, 860 also made payable to A B C. There was a '"'" 
of paper in the envelope which said "Art "..Jell i/85 I think." Also ! 
in the envelope was what appeared to be a piece of chipped r~.ines~c:=: 
or possibly a diamond. 
19. Ne~t item found was a checkbook with checks to Ro~ert Dolan, 735 ~~:·: 
North Te!Ilple, 261-9267 on t'1e Valley Bank & Trust at 1225 South ,.I 
Redwood Road, account #09-11-653-2. T:-iere was one check r.iade ?'Y"' 
to cash in the checkbook, check lrl34 for $2, 000 :'or ?.obe:-t and s'.(' 
simply "Robert.." This c't.e.:.k •,.·as dated 7-1'3-78. "I:"-:ere ·..:as no c:-.ec.( 
reg~ster in the checkbook itself. 
l U4TE 
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Next item was a receipt from Western Alternator & Generator Starter 
Company made out as "Sold to !lon Barker, 2780 South State" and the 
sum of $13.00 received as authorized signature Lester !lomoer. Total 
bill ·•as $16. 27. 
There was also a promissory note for $5,000 dated 8-21-78 from the 
Broadway Office of Zion's First National Bank. It was apparently 
a 30-dar, note to be r~paid 9-20-78. Person signing it was "Al 
Johnson'. Al Johnson signing it both places, giving as his address 
as 736 North West Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
"nlere was also a checkbook for Beaver Investments on the Zion's 
First National Bank, 102 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, account 
#01-13343-8, check made out 8-24-78 and #611 signed Al Johnson. The 
check was blank being payable to no one for no specific amount. 
Also there was a piece of paper indicating license plate for dump 
truck #A 60797. This numoer matches the registration found in the 
truck signed by Don Hurst. 
There was also a Warranty Deed wherein N. W. McLachlan, granter 
conveying property to Sirren Bybee of Salt Lake City. T:iis document, 
however, was not notarized, but it was signed purporting to be the 
signature of N. W. McLachlan. 
Also in the vehicle was a partial Utah plate, sticker number Utah 
'79 and it had the month 2 on it and was sticker #91486. This was 
found in the rear behind the actual seat itself. 
In the rear of the truck was found a box. On the box was 
envelope from "The Greenhouse" from Great ~eek, New York. 
letter was apparently mailed July 11, 1978 and was mailed 




These items were all secured for further investigation and as possible 
evidence. 
Also in the truck items which were left in the truck and were not secuTed. 
The following items were found in the cab of the truck' 
l. One AC fuel pump 
2. T-wo sets of miscellaneous keys 
3. One old fuel pump 
4. :"here •,;ere miscellaneous tools and small items of that nature. 
5. There were other papers and other minor items such as a cup, tooth 
~rush and things of that nature. 
In the rear of the vehicle items which were left are ·as follows' 
l. One spare tire with the rim with the tire in tack. 
2. A toolbox ~ade of wood ~ith miscellaneous-type tools inside. 
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I AOORESS l RES•OE'llCE PHONE 
A.001TIONAL INFORMATION a. SYNOPSIS 
3. There were two high-lift jacks and other oiiscellaneous tools scatte:;: 
across the bed of the truck. 
4. There were a number of other types of miscellaneous fishing gear and 
mechanical equipment. 
Prior to leaving the scene, the vehicle was impounded. See Sheriff's 
Department Report #78-60205. 
Mr. Romero was then taken to the Salt Lake County Jail where he was boo<ei 
Also included in the items taken was a Motorola Metro-Page Soy, '10994i. 
Mr. Romero was booked into jail at approxi~ately 0935 hours. 
Propr to the truck being i~pounded, l also noticed that the green Safety 
Inspection sticker did not appear to be stuck to the window. A closer 
examination revealed that the sticker was ta~ed on with scotch tape and 
had no writing on the back. This sticker was very easily re~oved and 
secured as evidence. Also taken into evidence was driver's license 
C224958 and secured as evidence as ~ell. 
I 
OISl'".:SIT!O!ll ':"NESTIGAiTQRSSIGNAiT\JRE I ::.>.TE 1 """P~OYEOBV \ 
L_ ______ _J ____________ J... ____ lc_ ______________ , 
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DEFENDANT'S j EXHIBIT INTHE CIRCUIT 
------
··-
COURT BOUNTI?'UL CITY 
I LR,.'1~~/0JG DAVIS I COUNTY OF ____ ~;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;:;;.:•_;ST~A~TE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY,) 
STATE OF UTAH )ss. 
BEFORE S. Mark Johnson 
JUDGE 
DEFl:i:::l~T"S ,.-D•E•FE•NmD•A•N! .. l 





745 South Main, Bountiful, Uta~ 
ADDRESS 
The undenicned beinc tirst duly sworn deposes and says: 
Thai ho 't~li~~ 
(has reason to believe) 
Thal J«lllC~X 
(on the prtmises known 11) 
~¥1l1<4¥llll4iX~!C 
,2250 South 800 West Woods Cro" 
A B C Stora~e/consistin~ of 4 set"arate concrete bl~ 
buildings containinl'; 128 rental unit storage "'"'" 
building 113 units 76 and 85 bein~ comected storaie 
...ru.ch are 12 x 12 x 60 feet storage ~arages rented: 
A B C in t.1'\e nam? of Art Wall 
In the City ol Woods Cross , County or Davis 
Stall of Utah, there is now cert~in proswrty, namely, 
A 1975 Conventional Kenworth Tractor Truck 
Model W 9M 
Vin ~143758S or VIN 111333833 
or Darts of that truck includin~ a 425 Cateroillar diesel ene,ine 
Minnesota license olate PR 20326 
Ownershio or registration pacers or said vehicle in the name of ~ax 
DeFlorin, 964 West Country Road, St. ?aul "linnesota, or F'abre~e !ne 
~•Kett.a Division . St. Paul, Minnesota or any nersonal orooerty ident! 
an t •l 511 property con~\atute5: able as belcnging to "1ax T)eflorin or his wi·1 
()(SLul•n ur emhirul"od pr11perty 
( • Pruperty used n a means or committinc a Celony 
(.(' Prop•rly or things in the possession oC 1 penon with the intent to uu it as a means of commiltini 
a public offense or in the posseuion or another to where he m1y hne delivered at tor the purpOP 
of conce111linc it or preventine it.s lJeint discovered 
( ) Controlled substances ind any Jevice, instrument, or paraph1.n1li1 wed for conaumin1, inhalinc. 
or to Cacihlillt the d1stributiun or production of controlled 1ubstances 
Th• Cacti to est.ibllsh the i:rounds ror issuance or I Search W1n1nt are: 
Your affiant is and at all times mentioned he:-ein as been an Investi~ator 
emoloyed by the Salt Lake County Attorney's Officer, and a Peace Officer~"' 
Deouty Sheriff for the Salt Lake Countv Sheriff's Office. 
On 8-25-78 your affiant arrested Lester Ralnh !lomero at 1800 West 6200 Soot\ 
Salt Lake County. 
At the time of his arrest and pursuant to his arrest, the truck which he''" 
driving, a 1970 Ford oickuc truck was seized. An inventory search was done 
that vehicle. On the front seat of the vehicle was an envecooe with a retu; 
a-dress of BRODISCO 3955 South State Street. Salt Lake City, Vtah ~4115 . .: 
envelooe had two one-cent star.tos en it and was acdressed to A B C 2250 Sout' 
800 West, Woods Cross, Utah 84087. 
Inside that envelooe were two mone:1 o!'-ders !'.ror.i State Savi:i.2s f.t. Loan Comuan~ 
One was J!04 710- 300-860 in the amount of $ 35. 00. The oavee on it was A ° C ,. 
it was not dated. The second one was 1!04-704,887,870 for 531.00. :he ,ave! 
being A S C with no date on it. 
These two money ·orders were inside a "Oiece of oaner that had the name .\rt ';a'. 
i!85 ! thir.k (this was handwritten "I t':1'!.nk" was also writ::e:i. en the oaJe~~,, 
On the back were a number of figures and the ;vcrd "rent" wri::en wit':! an · 
through the figu!'es. 
A check with the July 1978 Salt Lake Cit? :'e:leohone :Jirecto!"·t and 3diacent 
town directorv indicated t~at A S C was a s:ora2e ·.:Orr:."Jan:1 and t·'."la'.: i.: ·HS~: 
the address indicated on the envelorye_ 
Con:::..nued en :>:!?€ 1"..JC 
i 
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(2) 
Your affiant on 10-23-78 sooke with a confidential 
informant, who observed a copy of the front of this envelooe 
to A B C. lie staced that he had been told bv Lester Ral:>h 
Romero in the oresence of other oeoole that inside of the 
stora11:e units at A B C there was a stolen semi-tractor. He 
stated that he had had this inform4tion as of a~oroximately 
ten days orior to the date of this interview which was 10-23-78. 
This infor1114nt seated that he did not want his name 
used in any legal ?roceedings hecause he feared retaliation 
aeainst him in the form of ohvsical injury to himself or to 
his family. 
On 10-24-78 your affiant talked with Ron Lvle, who is 
presently an inmate of the l!tah State Prison. Lvle advised 
that aoproximatelv a vear and a half ago durine the su!'llT1er of 
1977, he was aporoached bv Lester Raloh ~omero, who asked Lvle 
to go to Provo, Utah and steal a Kenworth tractor that L·11e· 
could find at a particular location. Lyle stated that his 
best recollection was that it was a Kenworth Conventional 
tractor which was biege in color and he believed a 1972 to 
1973 model tractor. He seated chat it had a Caterpillar 
en11:ine in it, a 13-soeed Fuller transmission, it had a sleener, 
no C.B. radio, it had men and women's clothinR in it, all 
black interior, and oolished aluminum wheels. He stated it 
had what aopeared to be new General tires also on the vehicle. 
He stated that at the request of Lester Ralnh Romero 
he traveled to Provo, Utah with another individual and there 
entered this truck and stole it. L·1le stated that when he 
stole it, the truck was in a large emoty lot across from the 
Ramada Inn directly opposite the golf course in Provo, l!tah. 
Lyle stated that at the time he went down that it had started 
to rain and that during the time he drove the truck from Provo 
to Salt Lake it was raining. 
Lyle stated that he drove the truck from Provo, Utah 
to aooroximately 60th South and West Temole in Salt Lake County 
where he met Lester Ralph Romero and ~urned the truck over to 
Romero. He stated that he received Sl,000 from Romero for 
stealing the truck. 
Lyle stated that sometime later the truck was cainted 
black and silver. He stated that shortly after that he had had 
a conversation with Lester Ralnh Romero in which Romero stated 
that the Sheriff's Department had sconced him at 2100 South 
and had arrested him. Ile stated that they had taken at that 
time a brief case which contained a rental receiot to the 
garage at 60th South and West Temple. He stated as a result 
the truck needed to be moved. 
Lyle advised your af~iant that he and a relative of 
his then went to ~·J'oods Cross to a mini-s :or age yard there and 
rented a storage unit unde~ he oelieved the name of Don ~alone. 
He stated that he renteC three units at that time and that 
t~ose units were turned over to the control of Lester Raloh 
Romero, who placed cadlocks on the units and who ~aintained 
and retained the keys to those units. 
He further stated that after bein~ advised by Lester 
Raloh ~omero of the necessity to move the vehicle that it ~as 
cransoorted bv a friend a: ~is from 60th South and olaced inside 
c!"le r!l.ini-stora~e unit. He stated that he had bee:n to!.d by 
Lester ~al~h Romero that he ~ad dor.e work on chat tractor at 
c":--.e mini-storage uni~. but he Jid not actually see the wo7'<. 
He stated, however, that ~e did 20 to the mini-~torage ~nit on 
several occasions and did see c~e work as described ~y ~ester 
~aloh ~omero had been done on the tractor. He stated f~r:her 
that he last saw the craccor i~ the nini·sto~a~e unit i~ 
::ece-:r:ber of 1977 with the tires anC wheels removed. 
ii 
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Your affiant talked to the aforesaid confidential 
informant on 10-23-78 and he was advised of the color of the 
tractor in the mini-storage unit on Woods Cross was black and 
silver. 
On 10-24-78 your affiant talked to Lt. Bud G. Gillman 
of Provo City Police Department. He stated that a Stolen 
Motor Vehicle Reoort was filed with Provo City Police Decart-
ment which indicated the following. 
A Max De Florin of 964 West Coutnrv Road. St. Paul, 
~innesota had been in Provo with a 1975 Conventional Kenworth 
tractor, Model '.1 900 VP! 1}1437585 en Jul:- 1, 1977 'le stated 
that DeFlorin recorted that his tractcr had heen stolen some-
time during the night of 7-1-77 and 7-2-77. He stated the 
reoort was made at aonroximately 1,00 A.~. on 7-2-77. 
He stated that the report indicated that ~ax DeFlorin 
had tcld the officer tak1ng the reoort that he nad his wife 
had been travelin~ cross country together on this trip. 
'Thev had stopped at the 'lolidav Restaurant in Provo for dinner 
and returned to their motel at the Ramada Inn at apcroximatelv la,oo P.M. 
He stated t1at the report said th•t at that time the 
tractor-trailer was still there. He stated that he estimated 
the time o: the theft was bet,•een lLOO and 12,0o ->'clock on 
7-1-77 as it accarentl9 occurred about the time it started 
raining on that night.· 
He stated that there had been an insurance claim 
filed and apcarentlv it had heen naid. 
He stated that onlv the tractor was taken. The 
trailer was left. ~'hen your affiant talked to Ron Lvle, L'1le 
said that there was a trailer attached to the tractor at the 
time of the theft but the trailer was left and only the tractor 
was taken. 
Lt. ~illman advised your affiant of the follo~ing 
information which was on the stolen reoort. 
He stated that it was a stolen lq75 Xenworth Conven-
tional tractor. It had new oaint on the cab which was white 
over yellow. !le stated that there was a black emble"1 on 
the door which indicated that the truck belon~ed to Faber-,e 
Inc. Rayette Division, St. ~aul, ~innesota. 
He stated that thev had first received t'ie V!~ i!lJ338ll , 
but it had been corrected Sy ::he driver to V!N iil41758S and ' 
that that number was currentl•r entered on t?i.e stolen renort 
out of N.C.I.C. . 
The engi:1e in t.'1e truck was a 425 Catenillar enF.ine: !'.e 
stated t."'3t the re~rt indicated t.'iat it had all new C'-eneral tires and 
all al\JTlirn.:rn -t&eels. ~e renort stated t..~t ':here was no C.B. in t.1.e 
tr.JC.1< and t.'iat it had license elate PR 20325 in ~!i."lr\esota. 
On 11)-26-7~ your affiant sooke with James Ouar;1 • ..r1i~t7\ 
also an investiP,ator for the Sale Lake Cou;tt;: A:tor:iey s ()~ ic · 
He stated that he had just interviewed one ot t:i~ onwers o. AB~ b;1 the name ot Riley Good:el~ow. ~r. Good:ellc;w s~~~e~or 
that he received a money order in t~e mail 10-25-79 tor :~) -t~e contin·..led !'ental of Units 76 and :i85 in Building 3 o: ~:-.:,_e 
A B C comolex. ~e stated t'.'.i.at t!le envelooe ·vas ':he sar.i.e. as , __ .. 
B'.\OD!SCO one sho'W'Tl to him which ~v·as .1 CO!')y of the one t3..<t:n .-:: 
Leste!' l:laloh ?.of'!":.ero on 9-25-i8. He sta::ed t:"iat 1:ie a"io1..i.ed. ~'.",.~ 
~oney to !:nit sk75 and ~L-85 rental in :1:ie na:"'.'le of Art '.·."all : 
~ad no k~o~ledge of ~hat ~as in ':he unit a~d d~d not know ~~: 
i;all. :~e size of t:O.e t~.;o ~or.ne-:~ed ·.mits ·.vhich a!"e ac:•.Ja ... ~~ :< 
o~e unit is 12 x 12 x 50. ~fr r.vod:e:.:ow stated that "Jn"..':s 1 
35 are sti~~ controlled ~y ~~e ~erson rent~n~ as Art ·~all 
iii 
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WHER£lURF.. tht aHiant prny" th.al" Sean·h WarranL is issued Cur the seizure of 11id itfms (in the 







Subscribed and sworn lo b.erore me Lhis 
JUDGE 
In th•--------· 
Court of -------~ 
~·County, StaLe ol Utah 
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